



SLAVERY

THE

MERE PRETEXT FOR THE REBELLION;
NOT ITS CAUSE.

ANDREW JACKSON'S PROPHECY IN 1833.

HIS LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN 1843.

BEQUESTS OF HIS THREE SWORDS:

HIS SOLEMN INJUNCTION TO WIELD THEM "IN SUPPORT OF OUR GLORIOUS
UNION" AGAINST ALL-ASSAILANTS, WHETHER "FOREIGN
ENEMIES OR DOMESTIC TRAITORS."

PICTURE OF THE CONSPIRACY.

DRAWN IN 1863,

BY A SOUTHERN MAN.

PHILADELPHIA:
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1863.

THE SWORDS OF GEN. JACKSON.

THE following article is copied from a Kentucky paper (*The Louisville Journal*), in which it appeared at an early stage of the Rebellion. It is from the pen of one whose name often occurs in Parton's *Life of Jackson*, in connections showing the affectionate confidence entertained for him by the old hero of the Hermitage. Although specially addressed at that juncture to the people of Tennessee, with reference to the efforts then making by the conspirators to trepan that State into subserviency to their scheme of treason, the question here put will at once be felt by every true American heart to be one for which it has a ready answer.

The prediction of "OLD HICKORY," here seen to have been made by him THIRTY YEARS AGO, as to what would be "*the next* PRETEXT" used by the conspirators then already known by him to be plotting the destruction of "*the only good Government on the globe*," in order that they might build up their "Southern Confederacy" upon their country's ruins. That prediction forms a fitting introduction to the more recent character and designs of the same conspiracy, as depicted in the following pages by PAUL AMBROSE:

To the Editors of the Louisville Journal:

"Never take the field unless the Star-spangled Banner of your Country floats over your head."

You have recently reproduced the above words of Andrew Jackson, addressed during the secession-ordinance days of thirty years ago, to the people of South Carolina, his native State, as he believed, and as we all believed, until his biographer Parton established the title of North Carolina to the honor of having given the "old Roman" to our country. Your reproduction of them has suggested to me to send you some other words of his, no less pertinent to the solemnity of the present crisis in that country's fate. *A photographic fac-simile* of the original letter (of the entire letter, which is quite a long one) has come into my possession. No one acquainted with General Jackson's handwriting—and I am perfectly so—could hesitate to make oath to its genuineness. Upon first seeing it, the gentleman who sent it to me having stated in the note accompanying it that he "inclosed a *copy* of Gen. Jackson's letter," I exclaimed to my family, "Why he has made a mistake and sent me the very letter itself; I will swear to this being the General's handwriting, every word of it." In truth, however, it is only a *fac-simile* taken by the photographic process.

A UNION MAN.

[From the National Intelligencer, Washington, March 1863.]

THE SLAVE QUESTION

A PRETEXT

TO LEAD THE MASSES ON TO REVOLUTION.

Southern Ambition—The Climax Rebellion.

THE aspiration of Southern ambition which has reached to the climax of rebellion, was not the growth of a month or a year. Those who have watched the course of public events and noted the development of opinion in the South for years past have seen many signs of the coming peril; and, if the country was not prepared for it, it was not for want of an occasional warning. Everybody knew there were restless spirits in the South who would rejoice in the opportunity to destroy the Union, and that these were endeavoring to create a sectional sentiment that might favor the accomplishment of their wish. But the common faith of the country in the patriotism of the people of the South, and the profound conviction of the whole North, and we may say also of the larger part of the Southern communities, that no motive existed which could possibly stir up the people of any State to the mad enterprise of assailing the integrity of the Union, dispelled every apprehension on this score. The public generally regarded the danger as a chimera. Even the Government, which ought to have been distrustful enough to put itself on guard, seemed to be utterly unconscious of the gathering trouble. Never was a country taken so much at unawares.

The year 1860 was one of great prosperity. The nation exhibited something more than its customary light-heartedness, and had risen into a tone of hilarity from the peculiar excitements of the year. The spring was occupied with the celebrations of the

advent of the Japanese Embassy, which signalized the enlargement of our commerce with the East, and autumn was filled with pageants to welcome the heir of the British throne, whose visit was regarded as an event of national congratulation that promised long peace and happy fellowship with the world—a token of new strength and greater influence to the Republic. It was a year distinguished by public demonstrations of faith and hope in the future destiny of the country. Few persons were willing to believe, or allowed themselves to think, that, whilst we were thus increasing the popularity of the nation abroad and inaugurating an era of remarkable promise to the advantage of our foreign and domestic interests, there was any considerable party amongst us who could harbor the parricidal design of crushing these brilliant hopes in the destruction of the country itself; or that the band of political agitators, to whom the public was accustomed to impute such a design, could so infatuate their followers as to prevail with them to attempt it. It was in this state of confident security, and in the very midst of these peaceful manifestations, that the storm broke upon the country. Never was a nation so utterly unprepared for such an event.

Notwithstanding this dissonance between the tone of public feeling at that time, and the terrific incident which grated upon it with such inopportune discord, the rebellion was a predestined fact which came at its appointed day. The year, the month, almost the week of its explosion had been determined in councils held long before; and the plot had no regard to the barometer of national sentiment, indifferent alike to the good will which delights in establishing peace, or that more congenial mood which promotes quarrel.

It was foreordained that the Presidential election of 1860 should furnish, not the occasion, but the day of dissolution.

Let us endeavor to extract from the history of the times and our own observation of the character of our people what we can find to solve this problem. It has grown to be almost a universally accepted fact on the northern side of Mason and Dixon's line that slavery is the cause of the rebellion. This is so broadly received that the corollary derived from it seems, at this time, to be the axiom upon which the special friends of the Administration are endeavoring to direct the conduct of the war to put

the rebellion down. Slavery being the cause of the rebellion, the war, it is said, must be aimed at the extinction of slavery. With them it would appear to be no longer a point to compel the insurgents to submit to the laws and return to their allegiance; but rather to act on the assumption that no peace is desirable which leaves slavery an existing institution.

Slavery not in danger.—The Leaders knew it.—The Masses were Deceived.

I think this view of the origin of our troubles requires some qualification. Slavery, of itself and for itself, is not the cause of the rebellion. I do not believe that there was one intelligent, leading, and thinking man in the South, when this rebellion broke out, who imagined that slavery was in any kind of danger either from the action of the National Government or the State Governments; nor that it could be successfully assailed by the hostility that was exhibited against it in the public or private opinion of Northern society. I think that astute Southern statesmen were and are perfectly convinced that the Government of the United States, embracing both National and State organizations, afforded an impregnable security to the institution of slavery, which no power on this continent, in its lawful course of administration, could disturb. And, moreover, that the guarantees which these organizations combined offer to that institution are not only entirely adequate to its protection, but are such as no government ever before supplied; and such also as no government, of the same scope of jurisdiction and power, would ever again agree to make. It is the merest sham and make-believe for any Southern man to pretend that the institution of slavery was ever brought into peril before this rebellion exposed it to the dangers that now surround it. I can hardly suppose that any man of sense in the South could believe otherwise than that a war, once provoked between the States, would be the only effective agency which could destroy or impair it against the will and without the co-operation of the Slave States themselves.

Slavery may be said to be the cause of the rebellion only in the same sense in which we may affirm that cotton and sugar are the cause of it, or that Southern character, habits, climate, and social life are the sources out of which it has sprung.

**The Agitation of the Slave Question a pretext.—Its Operation on
the Excitable Masses of the South.**

The agitations of the slave question were only ostensibly the motives to rebellion. They were the means made use of to give pretext and consistency to the scheme. With the unthinking or excitable masses of the South, it is true, these agitations were the principal incentives to revolt. They furnished them a ready argument, and made the threat of breaking up the Union familiar to the Southern mind, and, to a certain extent, popular. They had something of the same effect upon portions of the people of the North; for the aversion to the Union was not alone harbored in the South. I have no doubt that the extreme opinions on this subject, preached and written by a sect in New England, had a most pernicious influence in extending the thought of dissolution through the South. There was an equal fanaticism on both sides, quite as evident in favor of slavery in one section as against it in the other. Secessionists and abolitionists, in the ultra phases of their respective demands, were in full accord as to the ultimate remedy of the grievances they imagined themselves to suffer. It was curious to see how, in ascending the gamut of their opposite extravagances, the two parties kept pace with each other on the scale of which the highest note on each side was disunion. Both North and South were, at the beginning, in harmony in admitting slavery to be a social evil which was to be considerably dealt with and abandoned when that could be done without injury to existing interests. From this point Southern enthusiasts diverged in one direction, Northern in another. With one, slavery rose to be asserted successively as a harmless utility, as a blessing, a divine institution, and, finally, as "the corner-stone rejected by the builders," upon which a new dynasty was to be constructed, and our old cherished Union to be dashed into fragments. With the other, always comparatively few and insignificant in point of numbers and influence it is true, slavery, passing through equal grades, was declared to be a disgrace; a great national sin; a special curse of Heaven, and, at last, a stigma that made the Union "a covenant of hell:" which, therefore, should be shattered to atoms to give place to another order of polity. The two opposite lines thus converged in the same point, that of

dissolution. This is the extreme boundary to which a passionate monomania has at last conducted the agitations of thirty years of the subject of slavery. The irritation produced by this persevering and angry reverberation of the question, from side to side, undoubtedly prepared the people of the South for the explosion of 1860, and equally prepared the people of the North for a prompt resentment against it; and thus misled the popular opinion on both sides to regard the slavery question as the immediate source of the attempt at revolution. But the contrivers, the heads and leaders of the scheme, had a much deeper purpose than the redress of any imagined danger to the security of the institution. They only took advantage of the common sensibility of their people on this subject to aid them in a design of much wider import.

We may find a guide to our investigation of this design in a review of the composition and character of Southern society.

Southern Character Analyzed.

It is not always a gracious task to analyze national character, and particularly when our own countrymen are in question. If, therefore, I should be thought too "candid" in what I am about to write, I hope I shall find my warrant in the sincere respect I entertain for the many excellent traits of Southern character, and still more in the esteem with which I cherish the memory of many personal friends in whom I have found everything to admire and really nothing to blame—except, indeed, the facility with which they have yielded to the delusion which carried them into this rebellion.

If I were asked to describe in a word the primal source or germ out of which this commotion has sprung, I would say it was the egotism of Southern character. There are no people in the world who have a higher opinion of themselves and of their surroundings than the inhabitants of certain districts of the South. They are accustomed to speak of themselves as possessing the very highest type of civilization; as pre-eminent in all the qualities of generous manhood; as hospitable, frank, brave beyond all other people; quick to resent dishonor; keen in their perception of what is great or noble; refined and elegant in manners. They claim, besides, superior talent, more acute insight, and higher

energy than their neighbors. They are prolific in statesmen, orators, and politicians. They are manly, truthful, and *chevaleresque*. This is the portrait they draw of themselves.

How and Why they Hate the Yankees.

Now, I do not mean to dispute these pretensions. The South possesses, in marked degree, many of these excellent qualities, and I would not disparage their claim to any of them, because I think that the very assertion of such a claim is the proof of an appreciation of these virtues, which in itself is a merit of good omen. It shows the tendency of their aspirations, which is one good step towards success in accomplishing them. But, on the other hand, we may remark that this self-esteem, whilst it exalts its possessors, is apt in the same degree to breed opinions derogatory of all other people outside of their boundary. The South accordingly has its aversions, and amongst these nothing is more conspicuous than the dislike of the common masses of the Southern people—I speak more particularly of the untravelled portion of them—to the natives of the New England States. This dislike is as old as the colonial era. Even in the Revolutionary war of 1776, if it did not impair the sturdy union of effort which won the victory, it bred minor dissensions and vexatious jealousies. The application of the word “Yankee” was even then, as it is now, an expression of the derision with which the man of the South regarded the man of New England. It signified at that day, and long afterwards, in the vulgar apprehension, a shrewd, cunning chapman, who invariably outwitted the credulous Southron in a bargain. It has lost something of this significance in these later times, since the credulous Southron has grown more worldly, and developed some of the qualities of an expert chapman himself. It now rather indicates the hatred engendered by jealousy of New England growth and prosperity.

In a sober estimate of all these characteristics, which it is hardly necessary to say are not to be attributed to the most cultivated and liberal men of the South, we may set down both the self-esteem and the aversion I have described to the account of that provincial vanity and prejudice which are always observed in isolated communities, and which, I think, are also, in some degree, distinctive of a simply agricultural people.

All Northern People are now called Yankees.

This popular dislike of the North, unreasonable and trivial as it is, has had a good deal to do with the aggravation of the temper which has fomented the rebellion. It quickened the jealousy of the South against every political movement in the country that indicated the probability of Northern control in the Government. Every revelation made by the census of the growing preponderance of Northern population—by which I mean the population of the Free States in general—was received by the South as the announcement of a rapidly advancing era when Southern domination must give way to Northern—when the sceptre must depart from Judah.

The South always afraid of Northern Presidents. Jefferson's Letter to John Taylor of Caroline, in 1798, referring to a "Scission of the Union," which he declared Unlawful. With the Right to Secede, no Federal Government could ever Exist.

I think we have very clear proof that at no time since the adoption of the Constitution were the politicians of the South disposed to tolerate the election of a Northern President, unless they had a satisfactory assurance that he would administer the Government in obedience to their dictation, or at least conformably to their views of policy. In the time of the elder Adams there was a settled, and even an exasperated opposition to him, which threatened to break up the Government, on this ground. Mr. Jefferson evidently alluded to this scheme, in his letter to John Taylor of Caroline, in 1798, in which he wrote an argument to discourage it—manifestly as an answer to some suggestions on that subject from his correspondent. His argument, I may remark, in passing, was equally against the right and the policy of such a proceeding. Referring to the "scission of the Union" as a supposed lawful resort, he declares that with it "no Federal Government could ever exist." There are many proofs now extant besides this of the reluctance of the Southern States to allow any influence but their own to predominate in the Government, even in that age of our republic, when it was not pretended that any Southern right was brought into jeopardy either by the National or State authorities or by the temper of private opinion.

The objection to Northern rule was simply founded on the pride of Southern ambition.

The Preponderance of Southern Influence Gone. The Union therefore no longer to be Endured.

It is only necessary to reflect upon the restiveness of Southern politicians of the last and the present generation, and to observe the solicitude with which they have always contemplated any invasion of their own supremacy in the Government, and the importunate zeal with which they have insisted upon preserving an equilibrium between Free and Slave States—meaning by that, the *preponderance* of Southern influence—to be convinced that the perpetuity of their control of the Administration has been the leading idea of their policy. The threat of disunion has been the customary persuasion by which they have, from time to time, endeavored to subdue the first symptoms of disaffection to their ascendancy. This had become the familiar terror of every Presidential canvass since the great flurry of nullification in 1832; and, in fact, its frequency had made it so stale that when, at last, the danger was really imminent, the country was incredulous of the event, as much from derision of the threat as a worn-out trick, as from the common conviction that no cause had arisen to provoke it.

Looking at the various pretexts upon which, as occasion prompted, this disunion was threatened—the tariff, the navigation laws, the distribution of patronage, the Texas question, the admission of California, the Kansas organization, the Territories—all of which have been used in turn by the Cotton States to frighten the nation with the danger of rupture, we have in these the most perspicuous guide to the true motives of the breach of 1861. The fact was then at last demonstrated that the hour was at hand when other interests in the country were to have a hearing and an influence, and that the majority of the nation meant to govern it; that the South must take its due and proper place in the Union and relinquish its ambition of undivided empire. That long-feared and long-warded-off day had come; and with it came the first real, unfeigned, absolute purpose of the partisan politicians of the Southern States in combination to separate the South from the North, and to attempt to build up a power at

home, in which Southern politics and Southern ambition should have undisputed sway. The Union was enjoyed as long as it ministered to the ascendancy of the Planting States, but was to be cast off as soon as the nation reached that epoch in its progress at which it was able to release itself from the thralldom of sectional control, and to regulate its policy in accordance with the demands of the general welfare.

Intense Selfishness of the Disunion Plot.

Never was the selfishness, which is the proverbial sin of politicians and the common imputation against corporate bodies, which the nobler qualities of individual manhood scorns and the morality of social life condemns, more conspicuously illustrated than in this example furnished by a people who boast not less of their honor than of their statesmanship. During a period of seventy years the oldest of these States—and the younger from the date of their organization—had drawn from the Union a power and prosperity they never could have obtained alone. It is not too much to affirm that they are indebted to the Union for everything which has made their position in the eye of the world worthy of consideration as a national power. To the Union the greater part of them owe their very existence: all owe to it their protection and defence, their flourishing commerce, their ready and cheap supply of manufactures, their conveniences of luxurious or comfortable life: they owe to the Union in great degree their internal improvements, and in no small proportion their most active and intelligent population. And now, conceiving that they have attained to a strength which will enable them to secure these advantages from their own resources, they do not hesitate to renounce their most sacred obligations of duty and obedience for the illusion of a national independence, which, whatever may be its import upon their own fortunes, they persuade themselves cannot be anything else than destruction to the prosperity of the comrades they seek to abandon.

It is lamentable to see this false estimate of duty in any section, but our regret is increased by the surprise with which we discover so many persons in the border States who have allowed themselves to think that, in following the lead of these counsel-

lors, they will ever find any adequate compensation for the sacrifice they make of the long career of happy fortune opened to them by the protection of the Union.

What is the Real Motive? Dominion, Empire.

What, we are now ready to ask, is the real motive for seeking this independence? Can it be for any advantage which a State of the Union, and especially any State within the compass of the old thirteen, could lawfully and honorably demand from its associates in the Confederacy?

In the adoption of the Constitution there was a plighted faith volunteered by every member of the Union to observe and keep every covenant expressed in that instrument. Each State relied upon the faith and honor of its sister State, and upon the pledge of the whole people of the United States to abide by the terms of that great compact, and to perform every duty it exacted of them. In fraternal reliance upon that honor, each and every State committed itself to all the responsibilities the Union imposed. Each willingly assumed these responsibilities, in full confidence that no one would ever shrink from its share in the participation of the common duty, but that all would religiously discharge every obligation of the compact. There was thus a perfect assurance given to the nation that whilst all enjoyed the profit, the prosperity, and the glory of the Union, all would equally adopt its burdens, and make whatever necessary sacrifice of individual or State advantage the common good might require. This is, in effect, the nature of the social compact presented by the Constitution. Certainly, we may say that, after entering into such an engagement as this, no State nor section of the people could, without great dishonor and breach of faith, refuse and abandon the performance of their stipulated obligations to their compeers, merely for the sake of making themselves independent. Even if there were an admitted right to retire, every consideration of justice would impose upon the malcontent fragment the duty of appealing to the rest who composed the body politic for their consent to a measure which must necessarily be an injury to them. How much more imperative is the duty of such an appeal when no such right to withdraw is contained in the compact, and when the proceeding, unless sanctioned by the

general consent of the nation, could only be classed in the category of revolution? To make a decent case of justification for revolution, every tribunal of moral law or enlightened opinion would hold that, as a preliminary fact, that consent should be asked and refused; and moreover, that the insurgent party should be able to show such a violation of compact by the offending Government as to produce intolerable oppression, for which no remedy was to be found but that of separation.

Now, nothing is more clear than that neither of these conditions existed. There was no consent sought for or expected; but, on the contrary, a haste in rushing into rebellion, which one might almost believe was intended to prevent the risk of either consent or conciliation. The conductors of the movement seemed to think, in the words of Sir Lucius O'Trigger, "The quarrel is a very pretty quarrel as it stands—we should only spoil it by trying to explain it." There was no intolerable oppression, or indeed oppression of any kind. The utmost point to which any mover of the sedition went, was to affirm that it was feared there might be some oppression hereafter—though that was not very intelligibly made out in the result of the Presidential election, which proved the successful party to be in a minority of the whole vote of the country. We had heard, it is true, a great deal about the iniquity of import duties and protection of domestic industry: but these were only the common resources of all Governments; and indeed, when it concerned Southern interests, were the special requisitions of Southern policy, which always insisted on the protection of sugar and cotton, and in past times demanded the highest duties on manufactures, as exemplified in the recommendation of the minimum principle which was introduced into the tariff of 1816 by Mr. Calhoun, with the express view of encouraging the manufacture of American cotton in order to exclude India fabrics from our market. We had heard a complaint that the bounty of the Government had fallen in stinted measure upon the South in the expenditures of the revenue; but the fact was that the public treasure was applied in that section to the establishment of forts, arsenals, navy-yards, hospitals, custom-houses, mints, and other public structures, quite as liberally as they were needed, and certainly without any idea of unjust discrimination; whilst, in

addition to these expenditures, enormous amounts, far greater than were appropriated to any other section, were expended in the purchase and defence of Southern territory.

It might be pertinently asked here, in reference to these complaints, did the South, by asserting its independence, expect to escape the necessity of raising revenue without a resort to imposts? Did it enter into their plan to abandon the protection of sugar, the manufacture of iron, of copper, of cotton, wool, leather, glass, or the many other commodities to which Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, and other parts of the South are now devoting capital, with anticipation of future enlargement? Would they be willing to hazard the experiment of refusing the demands of those States on this subject—*with that swift remedy of secession acknowledged as a power in their organization?*

I need say nothing here of the preservation of slave institutions as a motive to independence; I have already commented on that point; but I may add a few words on the extension of slavery into the Territories, which has latterly been presented as a question of injustice done to the South. In regard to that, I have to remark that the recent demand was for the right to plant slavery north of the latitude of $36^{\circ} 30'$ —the South had already secured the privilege south of that line, where every foot of territory was by law open to the admission of slavery.

It is a very notable fact, that, from the beginning of the Government, Southern statesmen have refused to allow slavery to go north of that line in the Territories. The Northwestern territory, embracing all the States north of the line, was made inviolably free soil by the demand of Virginia and the support of Southern votes. The Missouri Compromise was also a Southern measure, and its passage was hailed as the triumph of the South over the North. But was there really any wish to plant slavery north of that line? Is there a man of the South who would have engaged in such an adventure, if the prohibition of the Missouri Compromise had never been made? What inducement can be imagined which would persuade a Southern planter to abandon his productive sugar or cotton field, and to transport his slaves into the rigorous climate and to the ungenial cultivation of that grain-producing region, which is thronged with free emigrants, under whose competition slave labor falls to a mere cipher?

And, after all, I close this questioning with one more interrogatory: Would independence help this privilege, supposing it were of any value; would the Territories be open to slave settlement after the South had renounced the Union, and its projected revolution—if that were a destined event—had become a success?

Pursue this inquiry through all the details it may suggest, and when you have exhausted your catechism, you will find that the whole of these supposed motives for independence are utterly baseless; that they are simply pretexts and nothing more, employed as lures to entrap the ignorant or as topics to feed the sedition of men who welcome anything that may seem like argument to sustain a foregone purpose of revolt.

The pursuit of independence by these Confederate States has a very different aim from the redress of such shallow griefs as these.

Sources of the Rebellion.—True Pathway to them Indicated.

Whoever shall be able hereafter to reveal the secret history of those various conclaves which have held counsel on the repeated attempts to invade and conquer—or, as the phrase was, liberate Cuba; whoever shall unfold the schemes of seizing Nicaragua, of aiding revolution in Mexico, of possessing Sonora, will make some pretty sure advances in disclosing the true pathway to the sources of this rebellion. The organization of the Knights of the Golden Circle, and their spread over the country; their meetings and transactions; who managed them, and set them on to do their appointed work: whoever shall penetrate into the midnight which veiled this order from view, will also open an authentic chapter in the history of this outbreak.

A Great Scheme of Dominion in this Plot.

There was a great scheme of dominion in this plot. The fancy of certain Southern politicians was dazed with a vision of Empire. Years have been rolling on whilst this brilliant scheme was maturing in their private councils, and at intervals startling the nation by some unexpected eruption. The design, which lay too deep in darkness to be penetrated by the uninitiated, occasionally rose to the surface in some bold and rash adventure, which either the vigilance of Government or the imperfect

means of success, which the necessity of concealment imposed upon it, rendered abortive. The Cuban expeditions miscarried; the Sonora failed; the Nicaragua forays were defeated—all these chiefly by the careful watch of the Government. Large sums of money were squandered in these fruitless adventures, and many lives were lost. Worse than these mishaps, eager hopes were disappointed, and long-indulged dreams dissipated. It was found that the Union was in the way; that the Federal Government was the impediment, and, that as long as the South was bound to obey that Government, frustration of these cherished schemes was always sure to attend them. This experience bred the hostility of thwarted ambition against the Union, and turned the thoughts of these agents of mischief towards its destruction.

Overtures to the Emperor of France.

Then came the next movement. There is, I think, a better foundation than mere rumor for saying that overtures were made, before the rebellion broke out, to the Emperor of the French for support and patronage in the scheme; that a very alluring picture was presented to him of a great Southern Confederacy, to embrace the land of cotton, of sugar, of coffee, of the most precious tobaccos, and of the choicest fruits, of the most valuable timber and the richest mines—comprehending the Gulf States, Cuba, St. Domingo, and other islands, Mexico, Central America, and perhaps reaching even beyond into the borders of South America—a great tropical and semi-tropical paradise of unbounded affluence of product, secured by an impregnable monopoly created by nature. This large domain was to be organized into one Confederate Government, and provided with the cheapest and most docile and submissive of all labor; its lands were to be parcelled into principalities, and landlords were to revel in the riches of Aladdin's lamp. This was the grand idea which the Emperor was solicited to patronize with his protection, for which he was to be repaid in treaty arrangements by which France should enjoy a free trade in the products of French industry, and precedence in gathering the first fruits of all this wealth of culture. Certainly a very dazzling lure this to the good will of the Emperor!

It is said the Emperor was quite captivated with the first view

of this brilliant project, but on riper deliberation was brought to a pause. The scheme, he discovered, stood on one leg: the whole structure rested on slavery, which was much too rickety a support to win favor in this nineteenth century with the shrewdest of European statesmen. The plot was "too light for the counterpoise of so great an opposition." The structure might last a few years, but very soon it would tumble down and come to nought. And so, it is whispered, the Emperor declined the venture. This is a bit of secret history which time may or may not verify. From some inklings of that day which escaped into open air, I believe it true. We heard various boastings in the summer of 1860, of French support to the threatened separation, and there were agents in Europe negotiating for it. During all that preliminary period, there was a great deal said in the South about reviving the slave trade.

**The Emperor too Wary.—The Hook is next Baited with
Abolitionism for England.**

When the Emperor refused, this was suddenly dropped, and England was then looked to as the ally in the coming revolt. Abolition England was to be won by another strategy. The Montgomery Convention inserted a clause in the Confederate Constitution forbidding the slave trade; and, oddly enough for a Government founded on the central idea of slavery, the commissioners who represented it in England, were authorized to assure the British Minister that it was really the old Government which was fighting to perpetuate slavery, whilst the new one was only seeking free trade: thereby gently insinuating a disinterested indifference on the slave question, which might ultimately come into full accord with England on that subject.

**The Rebel Government's Platform regarding Slavery.—Its
Convenient Character.**

These revelations stand in strange contrast with the popular theme that has rushed so many into the rebellion. As the matter now rests, the rebel Government has quite platform enough to be as pro-slavery or as anti-slavery as its European negotiations may require; and if these should utterly fail, there is nothing in the constitutional provision to interrupt the African slave trade a single day. For what is that provision worth in a region where neither courts nor juries would execute the law?

The Grand Tropical Empire, as Originally Planned.—Secondary Rank assigned to the Border States.

Whilst this grand idea of tropical extension was seething in the brain of the leaders, and their hopes of fruition were vivid, the plan was to confine the revolt to the Cotton States—or, at least, to give the Border States a very inferior rôle in the programme. They might come in when all was adjusted, but were to have no share in the primary organization. Every one remembers how these Border States were flouted in the beginning, and told they were not fit to be consulted, and that the only advantage they could bring to the Southern Confederacy, was that of serving as a frontier to prevent the escape of slaves. But when the original plan was found to be a failure, the views of the managers were changed; the Border States became indispensable to any hope of success, and the most active agencies of persuasion, force and fraud were set in motion to bring them in. How mournfully did it strike upon the heart of the nation when Virginia, in the lead of this career of submission, sank to the humiliation of pocketing the affront that had been put upon her, and consented to accept a position which nothing but the weakness of her new comrades induced them to allow her!

The Pride of the South Unrighteous—Its Resentment Unjust—Their Punishment is Doomed.

Since the hope of this broader dominion has come to an end, the rebellion is still persistently pursued for the accomplishment of its secondary objects. There is still, doubtless, some residuary expectation that, even without foreign patronage, in the event of success, this desire of extension of territory may in time be gratified; but it is no longer the chief object of pursuit. The pride of the South, its resentment, its rage are all now enlisted in pushing forward to whatever consummation they may imagine to be attainable. They now insist on independence from the very hatred their disappointments have engendered. But they seek it, too, as the only method left for the maintenance of that class domination which they have ever enjoyed, and which they are now unwilling to surrender.

PAUL AMBROSE.

THOSE THREE SWORDS OF ANDREW JACKSON—WHERE ARE THEY?

A QUESTION PUT TO TENNESSEE BY A "JACKSON DEMOCRAT" OF THE OLD SCHOOL.

A month or two ago, Tennessee gave her answer to the question,—*Will Tennessee follow the example set her by some of her sisters, and allow herself to be made a puppet in the hands of South Carolina?*

What that answer was we all know. What it was to be, was predicted here (Philadelphia) weeks beforehand, by one of the most esteemed of our fellow-citizens, Col. Watmough. This noble old veteran of the war of 1812, whose good fortune it was at that period to be a sharer in the work of covering our flag with glory at *both extremes* of the Union—first on the frontiers of Canada, and last at New Orleans—foretold to his friends here what the vote of Tennessee was to be.

When asked why he was so confident on this point, he said: "I know the men, I know the stuff they are made of. At New Orleans, the most exposed part of our lines was on the extreme left—the swamps—where, owing to the character of the ground, no breastworks could be thrown up; consequently there was danger of our lines being turned by the enemy at that point. There were these Tennesseans posted; and there did they stand, in the mud and mire of that swamp, up to their knees, up to their hips, and without a single murmur. Jackson had said to them: 'My friends, I know it is hard to bear, but it is a thing which has to be borne; our country's flag must be defended. Be yours the glory of defending it at this point, where the service bears hardest upon those who render it.'

"Afterwards," continued the Colonel, "I saw a large proportion of those noble fellows in the hospital, prostrated by the fevers brought on by that exposure; and at the sight of them, and the vivid recollection which it brought with it of the heroic patience with which that exposure had been endured by them, my eyes filled with tears. This is the ground of the confidence which I feel, as to what the vote which Tennessee is now to give, will be. Her voters are the sons and grandsons of those same men whom I saw standing day after day in that Louisiana swamp. They will show now, I have no doubt, the same devotion to our country's flag which armed their fathers and grandfathers with the patience there exhibited by them."

Men of Tennessee! read the following words of Andrew Jackson. Having done so, put this question to yourselves: Whilst writing those words in his last will and testament, those words written "In the name of God, *Amen*," those words bequeathing in that holy name, the three "swords of honor" which he had received from his grateful countrymen,—had he, or had he not, in his mind that same conspiracy to rend this Union asunder and establish "a Southern Confederacy," that same conspiracy "to destroy the only good government on the globe," the actors in which he, ten years before writing that last will and testament, had denounced as "wicked demagogues," invoking upon them the doom of "Haman's gallows," and predicting that their "next pretext" *would be*, what we all now know that it *has been*, "the negro or slavery question?" Put this question to yourselves, I say. Put it, each man of you, to his own understanding and his own conscience. And, having received the answer given by those consciences, then let our country hear your answer to my inquiry: "THOSE THREE SWORDS OF ANDREW JACKSON—WHERE ARE THEY?"

On the 1st of May, 1833, Andrew Jackson, then holding the highest public trust in the gift of our country, wrote a private letter to his friend, the Rev. A. J. Crawford, of Georgia, which letter is, in part, as follows:

"I have had a laborious task here, but nullification is dead, and its actors and courtiers will be remembered by the people only to be execrated for their wicked designs to sever and destroy *the only good government on the globe*, and that prosperity and happiness we enjoy over every other portion of the world. *Haman's gallows ought to be the fate of all such ambitious men*, who would involve our country in a civil war and all the evils in its train, that they might reign and ride on its whirlwind and direct the storm. The free people of these United States have spoken, and consigned these wicked demagogues to their proper doom. *Take care of your Nullifiers*—you have them amongst you. Let them meet the indignant frowns of every man *who loves his country*.

"The tariff, it is well known, was a mere pretext." (He then gives the proof of this, afforded by the recent course of Calhoun, and his tools in Congress, on the new tariff bill; which they voted for, although it greatly increased the duties on coarse woollens and other articles consumed by the South, and closes with these words:) "*Therefore, the Tariff was only the pretext, and DISUNION and a SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY the real object. THE NEXT PRETEXT WILL BE THE NEGRO OR SLAVERY QUESTION!*"

On the 7th of June, 1843, the same hand which, ten years previously, had written that letter to the Rev. Mr. Crawford, wrote a last will and testament; which document is, in part, as follows:

"In the name of God, Amen. I, Andrew Jackson, Sr., being of sound mind, memory, and understanding, do make, publish, ordain, and declare this my last will and testament:

"First, I bequeath my body to the dust, whence it comes, and my soul to God who gave it, hoping for a happy immortality, through the atoning merits of our Lord Jesus Christ, Saviour of the world.

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"Seventh. I bequeath to my well-beloved nephew, Andrew J. Donelson, son of Samuel Donelson, deceased, the elegant sword presented to me by the State of Tennessee, *with this injunction*, that he fail not to use it, when necessary, in support and protection of our glorious Union, and for the protection of the Constitutional rights of our beloved country, should they be assailed by *foreign enemies or domestic traitors*.

"Eighth. To my grandnephew, Andrew Jackson Coffee, I bequeath the elegant sword presented to me by the Rifle Company of New Orleans, commanded by Captain Beal, as a memento of my regard, and to bring to his recollection the gallant services of his deceased father, Gen. John Coffee, in the late Indian and British wars, under my command, and his gallant conduct in the defence of New Orleans, in 1814-15, *with this injunction*, that he wield it in protection of the rights secured to the American citizen under our glorious Constitution, against all invaders, whether *foreign foes or domestic traitors*.

"I bequeath to my beloved grandson, Andrew Jackson, son of Andrew Jackson, Jr., and Sarah, his wife, the sword presented to me by the citizens of Philadelphia, *with this injunction*, that he always use it in defence of the Constitution and our glorious Union, and the perpetuation of our Republican system."